



































   













   
 
Massimo Morelli, Huanxing Yang and Lixin Ye
  
 
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS





EUI Working Paper ECO 2010/14 
 
This text may be downloaded for personal research purposes only. Any additional reproduction for 
other purposes, whether in hard copy or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s). 
If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the 







© 2010 Massimo Morelli, Huanxing Yang and Lixin Ye 
Printed in Italy 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy 
www.eui.eu 
cadmus.eui.euCompetitive Nonlinear Taxation and Constitutional Choice
Massimo Morelli,† Huanxing Yang,‡ and Lixin Ye§
March 2010
Abstract
In an economy where agents are characterized by dierent productivities (vertical types) and
dierent abilities to move (horizontal types), we compare a uniﬁed nonlinear optimal taxation
schedule with the equilibrium taxation schedule that would be chosen by two competing tax au-
thorities if the same economy were divided into two States. The overall level of progressivity
and redistribution is unambiguously lower under competitive taxation than under uniﬁed taxa-
tion; the “rich” are always in favor of competing authorities and local governments, whereas the
“poor” are always in favor of uniﬁed taxation. The constitutional choice between ﬁscal regimes
depends on the preferences of the middle class, which in turn depend on the initial conditions
in terms of the distribution of abilities (incomes), the relative power of the various classes, and
mobility costs. In particular, as mobility increases, it becomes increasingly likely that a reform
in the direction of uniﬁcation of ﬁscal policies in a federation will receive majority support, while
a decreased average wealth can have the opposite eect.
Keywords: Competitive nonlinear taxation, Mobility, Integration, Inequality, Type preferences
over institutions.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The constitutional choice of which “taxation regime” to select (centralized versus decentralized, State
taxes versus City taxes, European taxes versus national taxes etc.) may aect the location decision
and distribution of disposable income of consumers and producers, and may in turn be aected by
the perceived mobility and by the initial conditions in terms of relative power of the various classes.
In the case of the European Union, the increased mobility of citizens and the recent expansion of
the Union clearly have eects on the taxation systems of the various States, and in turn the new
conditions in terms of distribution of incomes and classes aect the likelihood of further integration
steps.
We are used to think that the level of progressivity of a tax system is mainly a political choice,
reﬂecting the ideology and the preferences of the class(es) holding power. On the other hand, we are
used to think of the institutional choice “State versus Federal taxes,” “City versus State taxes,” or
“property taxes versus centralized funding of schools” as mainly due to e!ciency or freedom to choose
considerations. This paper challenges the view that this issues can be separated, demonstrating that
even if taxes are always chosen “optimally” on the basis of standard utilitarian criteria, a centralized
taxation system leads to higher progressivity for any distribution of types and preferences.
In order to compare the eects and the origins of centralized versus decentralized taxation sys-
tems, we consider a framework in which two States compete for dierent agents (citizens, workers,
or consumers) along two dimensions. The vertical dimension captures the agents’ heterogeneity
in terms of their innate abilities or productivities. The horizontal dimension captures the agents’
heterogeneity in terms of their abilities to move from one State to the other, or equivalently, their
location preferences, reﬂecting their tastes for dierent cultures, landscapes, food, political systems,
weather conditions, etc.
Under a uniﬁed taxation system, the Federation’s objective is to choose an optimal tax schedule
to maximize a weighted average utility of all the citizens in the economy. Under the independent
taxation system, each State’s objective is to choose a tax schedule to maximize the weighted average
utility of all the citizens choosing to live in the State, given the other States’ tax schedules. At the
constitutional stage, the representatives of the various types or classes of citizens evaluate the two
regimes on the basis of the solutions of these maximization programs.
In the base model we consider the case in which agents have three vertical types, type K (the
rich), type P (the middle class), and type O (the poor). Under the independent authority regime,
2a taxation authority has to take into account not only the resource constraints and incentive com-
patibility constraints of a standard optimal taxation designer, but also the additional individual
rationality constraint derived from location preferences. In this independent taxation regime the
tax for the high type is lower and the subsidy for the low type is lower accordingly. Moreover,
we show that under the independent regime the total output and consumption are higher, but the
total welfare is lower, regardless of the preferences of the middle class. Intuitively, with competition
each independent tax authority tries to attract more high type citizen-workers (so as to raise its tax
revenue to subsidize the low type). This competition eect reduces the tax to the high type, which
means that the subsidy to the low type decreases accordingly.
The representatives of the interests of low productivity types (the poor) should always be in favor
of a uniﬁed taxation regime. On the other hand, the representatives of the high productivity types
(the rich) should prefer the independent regime. Hence the constitutional choice between the two
regimes can always be thought of as determined by the preferences of the middle class (excluding the
trivial cases in which one of the two extreme types has the absolute majority at the constitutional
stage). Even though a uniﬁed regime always yields higher welfare, we can show that a country with
better initial conditions (higher average productivity) may end up with lower welfare because the
majority decision can favor decentralization at the constitutional stage.
One of our clearest ﬁndings is that, as mobility increases, it becomes increasingly likely that the
decisive middle class will prefer to have (or to switch to) a uniﬁed system. The intuition for this
robust result is as follows: under any taxation regime the middle class “beneﬁts” from the presence of
richer citizens who pay more taxes (or even pay them indirectly a transfer) and “suer” from having
to support the poor through the tax system; under a uniﬁed system these two contrasting eects do
not depend on mobility costs, but in the independent system they do: as mobility costs go down,
competition for the rich reduces the “beneﬁts” mentioned above, while the need to support the poor
remains roughly unchanged, hence the previously indierent middle type likes the uniﬁed system
more in relative terms. Our computations also show that the greater the size of the middle class, the
more likely it is that the preferences of such a decisive class will be in favor of independent taxation,
as the support of the poor is more spread out. Finally, our computations show that the larger the
population of the poor, the more likely that the middle type will prefer independent taxation, as the
fear to support the poor increases.
For robustness check we extend our analysis to the continuous type model, which can be regarded
3as the limiting case of many ﬁnite types. With a continuum of types, the tax schedule chosen under
each regime is characterized by a second-order dierential equation with two boundary values. By
focusing on the case where the vertical types are distributed uniformly, we are able to show that
under independent taxation, the higher the mobility, the higher the consumption for all but the
highest and lowest types; the rich (types su!ciently close to the highest type) pay lower tax, and the
poor (types su!ciently close to the lowest type) receive lower subsidy under competition; there exists
ac u t o  type W so that all types above Ware better o,a n da l lt y p e sb e l o wW are worse o with
competition. Our computations conﬁrm most of the ﬁndings from the three type model regarding
the preferences of the median type, who is responsible for the constitutional choice.
It is important to remark that when we talk about constitutional choice we always think of it
as being made by the same people who are then going to be subject to the regime they choose, the
opposite extreme with respect to a choice made behind a veil of ignorance. Thus, we have in mind
situations like the choice to adopt or not a new constitution with more integrated ﬁscal policy in the
European Union, where preferences for such a potential reform are likely to be aected by self interest
considerations by the citizens who would be asked to ratify it. Our analysis in this research provides
a number of considerations and interpretations regarding such situations in the European Union. As
barriers to labor mobility fall and mobility costs go down, a ﬁrst ee c tb a s e do no u ra n a l y s i si sa
reduction in redistribution if independent taxation systems remain; but the second eect from our
analysis is to make the median type more and more likely to prefer the uniﬁed system, hence the
downward trend of progressivity could at some point be reversed by a spontaneous constitutional
reform towards a uniﬁed government. However, expansion to include more poor countries shifts those
preferences of the median type back, away from uniﬁcation of ﬁscal policy. So the expansion decision
is something that favors the rich, because they eliminate for the near future the possibility that the
median voter will require a uniﬁcation of ﬁscal policy in Europe.
Related Literature
Our paper contributes to the literature on optimal income taxation with mobile labor and competi-
tion. A general view from this literature is that the ability of individuals to move from one jurisdic-
tion to another imposes additional constraints on the amount of redistribution that each jurisdiction
can undertake (see, for example, Wilson, 1980, 1992; Mirrlees, 1982; Bhagwati and Hamada, 1982;
Leite-Monteiro, 1997; Hindriks, 1999; and Osmundsen, 1999). More recently, Wilson (2006), Krause
4(2007), and Simula and Trannoy (2009) study how allowing agent migration aects the optimal non-
linear income tax schedule of a State, taking the other States’ tax schedules as exogenous outside
options.1 Hamilton and Pestieau (2005) provide a general equilibrium analysis of tax competition
among a large number of small countries. They consider two skilled types and that only one type
can move.
To the best of our knowledge, Piaser (2007) and Brett and Weymark (2008) are the only pa-
pers that model the strategic interaction between tax authorities as we do. Piaser (2007) analyzes
competitive nonlinear taxation between two governments with two types of workers. In order to
analyze the eect of competition on the progressivity of income taxes and say something about the
relationship between constitutional choice and the degree of inequality, it is necessary to have at
least three types, which we do in our model. The analysis with three types involves problems that
do not arise with two types, as will be clariﬁed below.
Brett and Weymark (2008) analyze strategic nonlinear tax competition between two governments
with a ﬁnite number of types of agents. Unlike in our model, they assume perfect mobility so agents
are only dierentiated along the vertical dimension. They show that there do not exist equilibria
in which either the highest type pay positive taxes, or the lowest type receive positive subsidies,
which is an illustration of the “race-to-the-bottom” proposition in the context of tax competition
with perfect mobility. This result is consistent with ours when the mobility cost parameter n $ 0.
The eect of mobility and competition on progressivity has also been analyzed in contexts other
than income taxation. For example, it is well established that capital tax competition leads to lower
taxes and lower e!ciency when tax revenue is used for public good provision, in contrast with the
Tiebout hypothesis.2 The most related paper to ours in the literature of capital tax competition is
perhaps the recent one by Hatﬁeld and Padro i Miquel (2008), because they too study the preferences
of dierent citizens for the dierent levels of decentralization of taxes. They model both the con-
stitutional stage and the tax implementation stage as a median voter’s choice, whereas in our view
1In particular, Simula and Trannoy (2009) show that mobility signiﬁcantly alters the closed-economy results, as a
“curse” of the middle-skilled agents is identiﬁed: the marginal tax rate is negative at the top, and the average tax
rate is decreasing near the top. In our model, by endogenizing the outside option, we show that such a “curse” of the
middle-type agents disappears.
2See Wilson (1999) for a survey. The famous Tiebout hypothesis, in favor of independent policy-making with perfect
mobility, was expressed in Tiebout (1956). A standard reference for the ﬁrst opposing view is Oates (1977). See also
Huber (1999).
5the constitutional choice is the only one that makes sense to relate to voters’ preferences directly.
The choice of a tax schedule in a given system is instead an outcome of political competition, which
leads under standard assumptions to an outcome equivalent to the solution of an average utility
maximization problem.
The connection between mobility and redistribution of income was studied in Epple and Romer
(1991) in the context of local property taxes. Basically they develop a general equilibrium frame-
work in which the population of each local jurisdiction is endogenously determined. Tax rates and
redistribution levels are chosen by majority vote of local residents. Voters anticipate changes in
housing prices and migration that will occur in response to changes in the local tax rate and level of
redistribution.
In terms of modeling and technical issues, our paper is most closely related to Rochet and Stole
(2002), who study a model of monopolistic and competitive nonlinear pricing with both vertically
and horizontally dierentiated agents.3 Our analysis is an application of this general framework in
the context of optimal taxation, with two main distinguishing features at the technical level: ﬁrst,
we need to take into account the resource constraint, and eectively deal with a new state variable in
our optimal control program; second, given our focus on the preference of the middle class, we need
to solve a three-type model for the uniﬁed and decentralized system, and this calls for additional
care in dealing with the incentive compatibility constraints.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we analyze our base model with three ability
types under both the uniﬁed and independent taxation regimes. Section 3 analyzes the case of a
continuum of abilities. Section 4 provides concluding remarks with some directions for future research
and extensions.
2T h e B a s e M o d e l
Citizens (or workers/consumers) are characterized by identical preferences and dierent abilities
(i.e., marginal productivities). Given consumption (or after-tax income) F and labor supply o,t h e
preferences can be represented by the following quasi-linear utility function:
X(F>o)=x(F)  o (1)
3Also see Yang and Ye (2008) for a similar framework allowing for partial market coverage along vertical dimension.
6where x(·) is strictly increasing, strictly concave and twice continuously dierentiable.4 Let T denote
the total product or before-tax income, then F = TW(T),w h e r eW(·) is the tax schedule set by the
tax authority. A citizen’s ability is denoted by , which captures the (constant) marginal productivity.
We assume that the labor market is competitive, and the wages are bid up to the marginal
productivities of workers, which implies that T = o. The utility function (1) can be rewritten as
follows:
X(F>T;)=x(F)  T@ (2)
In this base model we consider three ability types: type K (the “rich”), type P (the middle
type), and type O (the “poor”), with abilities K, P and O, respectively (K A P A O).
We consider two States in a potential Federation — the minimal situation in which we can compare
the progressivity of competitive State taxation versus that of a uniﬁed Federal tax.5 Each State l,
l =1 >2, has a total measure (population) of 1 original citizens attached to it. The State that a
citizen is initially attached to is called her home State. Citizens can move from their home state to
the other state. The cost of moving is given by (1  {)n,w h e r e{ denotes a locational preference
which is individual speciﬁc, { 5 [0>1],a n dn is a common factor aecting the moving cost for all the
citizens. More speciﬁcally, { measures the degree of ﬂexibility of a citizen: the smaller is {,t h el a r g e r
is the moving cost, or the greater the attachment to the home State.6 On the other hand, the smaller
n, the smaller is the moving cost (given {), or the more intense the competition between the two
States, as people put less weight on their locational preferences. While { represents a personal cost
i na d j u s t i n gt ol i f ei nan e wS t a t e ,n can be interpreted as some common component of adjustment
cost.
We assume that n is a (strictly) positive constant that is commonly known, but neither the
4We assume that preferences are quasi-linear in labor. There is a tradition of using such preferences, see, for
example, Lollivier and Rochet (1983), Rochet (1987), and Boadway et al. (2000). Some more recent work has tended
to opt for preferences that are quasi-linear in consumption (e.g., Diamond, 1998, Saez, 2001, and Salanie, 2003).
We have tried both utility speciﬁcations. For the discrete type model, the qualitative results are the same. But for
the continuous type model, with quasi-linearity in consumption the dierential equation system characterizing the
equilibrium under independent taxation becomes too complicated, which makes it hard to compare with the solution
under uniﬁed taxation. For tractability we thus follow the more traditional approach, assuming that the preferences
are quasi-linear in labor.
5Our analysis would apply unchanged to two cities whose provinces or counties together constitute a State, hence
comparing the properties of centralized State level taxation against decentralized city level taxation.
6The citizen with { =0is the least mobile, while the citizen with { =1is the most mobile.
7ability  nor the locational preference parameter { is observable to the tax authority. Thus a citizen
is characterized by a two-dimensional private type (>{). Using jargons in the industrial organization
literature,  can be regarded as the “vertical” type, while { can be regarded as the “horizontal” type
in a Hotelling-type model (so that a citizen with a smaller { can be regarded as being located closer
to the base of her home State).
We denote the corresponding proportions of the three types by K, P and O, respectively, and
that { is uniformly distributed on the interval [0>1].7
Each State l decides on a tax schedule Wl(T).G i v e n( W1(·), W2(·)), workers choose their State of
residence and then T, to maximize x(TW(T))T@. It is obvious that the single crossing property
only holds along the vertical dimension. The implication is that the tax authorities can only design
tax schedules to sort agents along the vertical dimension.
It is well known that in the environment of competitive mechanism design, it is no longer without
loss of generality to restrict attention to direct contracts (Martimort and Stole, 1997 and Peck, 1997).
To sidestep this problem, we restrict attention to deterministic contracts to consider direct contracts
of the form {F()>T()}M{K>P>O}.8 The tax amount incurred by type- citizen is then given by
the tax function W()=T()  F(). For brevity of exposition, from now on we will often refer to
vertical types as simply the types, especially when there is no confusion in the context.
Formally, under the independent taxation regime, the time line is as follows. In period w =1 ,
each State chooses its taxation schedule Wl(·) (or equivalently, the menu of contract of the form
{Fl()>T l()}) simultaneously and independently. In period w =2 ,g i v e n( W1(·), W2(·)), workers
decide on the location and the labor supply (or equivalently, the contract (F>T) to accept). In
period w =3 , production (or pre-tax income) is realized and taxes are collected according to the tax
schedules pre-announced at w =1 .
The tax authorities are benevolent. They share the same social preferences over the utility space,
represented by the welfare function Z(XK>X P>X O),w h e r eXl = x(Fl)Tl@l, the utility per capita
of type l, l = K>P>O. We assume that the tax authority is a weighted utilitarian, with the weights
7Assuming some other distributions may not alter our main results, as we will focus on symmetric equilibria in
which no citizens move. However, doing so will necessarily complicate our equilibrium analysis.
8See Rochet and Stole (2002) for a discussion on the restrictions resulting from focusing on deterministic contracts.
More general approaches to restore the “without loss of generality” implication of the revelation principle in the
environment of competitive nonlinear pricing have been proposed and developed by, for example, Epstein and Peters
(1999), Peters (2001), Martimort and Stole (2002), and Page and Monteiro (2003).
8being the proportions of the three ability types.9 Thus each tax authority’s objective is to maximize
the following welfare function:
Z(XK>X P>X O)=KXK + PXP + OXO= (3)
Note that in our analysis the welfare function does not depend on the horizontal “market shares”
(that is, the horizontal measure of citizens for each ability type). There are two reasons for us not
to consider this more complicated weighting scheme. First, should we include the horizontal market
shares in the welfare function, then by simply attracting more high type workers, the total welfare
will increase even if the utility per capita for each type remains unchanged, which is an undesirable
feature. Second, the weights used in a social choice function are usually exogenously given. If we
include the endogenously determined market shares in the weights, our analysis can easily become
intractable. Also note that although horizontal market shares do not enter the objective functions,
competing for higher type workers along horizontal dimension is still important as redistribution is
the only purpose of taxation in our model,10 and hence the tax authority always has an incentive to
attract more “rich” to subsidize the “poor” to improve the (weighted) welfare.
As the utilities of the citizens and the resulted market shares for two States are functions of the
tax schedules, we can focus on the analysis of period 1 only. This can be done by replacing periods
2 and 3 with the correlated payos as functions of the tax schedules. Our solution concept in this
reduced one-shot game is Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, which is characterized by the pair (W1(·)>W 2(·)):
given W3l(·), Wl(·) maximizes the welfare function (3) among the workers who choose to reside in its
State subject to the usual incentive compatibility and resource constraints, l =1 >2.
This basically completes a description of the model with independent taxation. For the model
of uniﬁed taxation, all the modeling elements are the same as in the independent taxation model,
except that the two tax schedules are now designed by a Federal authority, whose objective is to
maximize the welfare function (3) among all the citizens living in the Federation.
As a benchmark, in autarky economy without taxes (T = F), the optimal consumption FW() is
9The weighted utilitarian social welfare can be regarded as a linear approximation of a general quasiconcave social
welfare function at the initial utility levels (Weymark, 1987). We choose the weights to be the proportions of the three
ability types because the treatment of each class should intuitively reﬂect it’s relative size.
10Since public goods are absent in our model, redistribution is the only purpose of taxation.
9characterized by
x0(FW)=1 @= (4)
The optimal consumption or before-tax income does not depend on { in autarky, and each citizen
should live in her own home State. Moreover, it is easily veriﬁed that FW() is strictly increasing in
.
2.1 Uniﬁed Taxation
Under uniﬁed taxation, we solve for the tax schedule that maximizes the weighted utility of the
citizens in the Federation. Since the two States are identical in terms of the original composition
of the population, we focus on the symmetric solution in which each State oers the same menu of
contracts and the resulting “market shares” are symmetric.11


























subject to the binding resource constraint
K(TK  FK)+P(TP  FP)+O(TO  FO)=0 > (RC)
and the incentive compatibility (IC) constraints, which basically require that no type has incentive











































11We focus on the symmetric solution here for ease of comparison with the independent case, where we will focus on
symmetric equilibrium in which each State oers the same menu of contracts. While a formal proof is not attempted
here, we conjecture that symmetric solution is optimal for the Federation.
10Working with all 6 inequalities can be quite tedious. It turns out that with a monotonicity constraint
TK  TP  TO (which implies FK  FP  FO), only the two local DIC’s bind:
Lemma 1 The set of IC constraints under uniﬁed taxation is equivalent to the monotonicity con-
















We will solve the relaxed program by ignoring the monotonicity constraint (we shall do the
consistency check after we have obtained the solutions). For the Lagrangian let the multipliers of


































= Kx0(FK)+Kx0(FK)  KU =0
CO
CFP
= Px0(FP)  Kx0(FP)+Px0(FP)  PU =0
CO
CFO
= Ox0(FO)  Px0(FO)  OU =0




























P  K + P
First of all, it is clear that the solution does not depend on n, the mobility parameter, as a direct
consequence of our focus on symmetric solution. Second, it can be veriﬁed that x0(FX
P) A 1@P and
x0(FX




O (due to the concavity of x(·)), i.e., compared to the
autarky case there is no distortion of consumption for type K, but the consumptions of type P and




K,t y p eP and type K
never pool in the optimal solution.
Lemma 2 In the optimal solution under uniﬁed taxation, WK AW P > WO.














But this contradicts the fact that FK =a r g m a x F{x(F)  F
K} (x0(FK)=1 @K)a n dFP ?F K.















By the properties of x(F), the function x(F)  F
P is strictly concave, which means that x(F)  F
P
is strictly increasing in F for F  FW
P.S i n c e FO 6 FP,w eh a v ex(FP)  FP
P > x(FO)  FO
P .A
contradiction. Thus we must have WP > WO.
Given WK AW P > WO,b y( R C )w em u s th a v eWK A 0:i fWK  0, then by the lemma both WP
and WO are strictly negative, and (RC) will be violated. Similarly, we must have WO ? 0.T h es i g no f
WP is ambiguous and depends on parameter values. So under a uniﬁed regime, while the rich always
pay taxes and the poor receive subsidies, the middle class may pay taxes or receive subsidies.
2.2 Independent Taxation
Under the independent taxation regime, each State chooses its taxation schedule simultaneously and
independently to maximize the weighted utility of the classes of citizens residing in its own State,
given the other State’s taxation schedule. Given that the two States are identical, we focus on
symmetric equilibria in which both States choose the same taxation schedule.
Since everyone is required to participate in one of the tax systems, the individual rationality
constraint only concerns which State to live in. Let ym  x(Fm)  Tm@m be the rent provision to
type m citizen who accepts contract (Tm>F m). Suppose the other State’s taxation rule leads to rent
12provisions yW
m, m = K>P>O. Then a citizen with vertical type m and horizontal type { will stay with
her home State if and only if
ym > yW









When ym  yW
m,a l lt h et y p e - m citizens in the State in question will stay with their home State, and





@n in the other State will move to the State in question.
Therefore for vertical type m, the total measure of horizontal types that will reside in the State in





@n.12 For this reason, {m deﬁned below can be regarded as the “market






The objective of the State in question is to maximize KyK + PyP + OyO, subject to the
appropriate resource constraint and the incentive compatibility constraints. The resource constraint
is given by
K{K(TK  FK)+P{P(TP  FP)+O{O(TO  FO)=0 >
where {m’s are given by (7).
It turns out that the IC constraints under independent taxation are much more involved than in
the uniﬁed taxation case.
Like in the ﬁrst two steps in the proof of Lemma 1, the 6 IC’s (5) can be reduced to 4 local IC’s
(DICKP,D I C PO,U I C PK,a n dU I C OP) plus the monotonicity constraint TK  TP  TO.
We then argue that UIC’s cannot bind so these two constraints can be dropped. Given each
State’s objective function, each State has incentive to redistribute as much as possible.13 But this is
restricted by the DIC’s. With independent taxation, each State tries to steal the high types from the
other State. The purpose of this move is not to attract high types per se, but to increase its total
tax revenue from high types. Given that redistribution is only restricted by DIC’s, UIC’s should not
bind in equilibrium.
Lemma 3 Under independent taxation, the UIC’s are inactive.
12Apparently this expression also applies when ym ?y
W
m.
13In the complete information benchmark, it is easily seen that given the concavity of the utility function, the solution
would have only the high type working, redistributing income to the other types.
13Proof. See Appendix.
Given that UIC’s can be dropped, the State in question has the following programming problem:













K{K(TK  FK)+P{P(TP  FP)+O{O(TO  FO)=0
TK  TP  TO
where {m’s are given by (7).
Unlike in the uniﬁed taxation case, under independent taxation the DIC’s may not bind simul-
taneously.14 One or both DIC’s may not bind since two States are competing for higher type agents
under independent taxation. The rent provision for K type now depends on two forces: competition
in the horizontal dimension and self-selection (sorting) in the vertical dimension. If competition is
strong on the horizontal dimension, then K type will secure high rent anyway, which makes sorting
in the vertical dimension automatically satisﬁed and the DIC’s not binding. Hence we need to cover
multiple cases.
Case 1: Both DIC’s bind. Let K and P be the multiplier of DIC-H and DIC-M respectively,
and let U be the multiplier of RC. We ﬁrst derive the ﬁrst order conditions, then impose
symmetry. In the symmetric equilibrium, yl = yW
l, l = K>P>O.T h u s t h e F O C s c a n b e
14The argument showing that the DIC’s must bind under uniﬁed taxation does not work here. To see this, suppose in
a candidate symmetric equilibrium DIC(H) does not bind. Now if State 1 increases TK and decreases TP by the same
amount, this might lead to budget deﬁcit for State 1, as some K type will move to State 2 and some P type will move
to State 1. Under uniﬁed taxation, the central authority can change the tax schedules of two States simultaneously,






































































































P  K + P + PUWP@n
x0(FO)=
OU
O  P + OUWO@n
As in the uniﬁed taxation case, it can be veriﬁed that x0(FP) A 1@P,a n dx0(FO) A 1@O.
Therefore, compared to the autarky case there is no distortion at the top, but the consumptions
of type P and type O are both distorted downward. Moreover, following exactly the arguments
paralleling those in the proof of Lemma 2, we have WL
K AWL
P  WL
O.A sar e s u l t ,WL
K A 0, WL
O ? 0
and the sign of WL
P is ambiguous.















WK = nP(K  P)+nO(K  O);
WP = WK  n(K  P); WO = WP  n(P  O)=
15Clearly, consumption is no longer distorted: FL
m = FW
m, m = O>P>K.M o r e o v e r ,WK AW P A



































From the above inequalities we can see that if n is small enough, the dierence between WK and
WP and that between WP and WO will be su!ciently small. As a result, the DIC’s will not bind
as n is su!ciently small. In the limit as n $ 0, WK, WP and WO all go to zero. This is consistent
with Brett and Weymark (2008), who show in a model with perfectly mobile agents (that is,
n =0in our model), that there does not exist any equilibrium in which the highest type pays
positive taxes, or the lowest type receives positive subsidies under competitive taxation.
Case 3: One DIC binds and the other does not. Here we only consider the case when DIC-H
is slack but DIC-M binds (the analysis for the other case is similar). In this case, we have














That is, there is no consumption distortion for types K and P, but the consumption of type
O is distorted downward.16 The expressions for P, U and x0(FL
O) are the same as those in
(8). In this case, we have WK AW P AW O.
To summarize, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 4 In the symmetric equilibrium under independent taxation, WK AW P  WO.
So as in the uniﬁed taxation case, in the equilibrium of the competitive taxation regime, the
rich pay taxes, and the poor receive subsidies. The middle class, however, may pay taxes or receive
subsidies. We now turn to the comparisons of the two taxation systems.
15So Fm’s are the same as in the autarky case, though Tm’s are dierent.




O have no distortion
but F
L
P is distorted downward.
162.3 Comparison
Our ﬁrst comparison result shows that competition increases consumption for both the middle class





P: competition increases consumption for both types M and
L.
Proof. See Appendix.
The proof is rather tedious, and is therefore relegated to the appendix. Although the consumption






K. That is, type K pays lower taxes and is better o under
independent taxation.
Proof. We ﬁrst consider the case that both DIC’s bind under independent taxation. By RC, DIC-H,
and DIC-M, we have
TK = KFK + PFP +( 1 K)K[x(FK)  x(FP)]
+O[FO + P(x(FP)  x(FO))] (9)
Deﬁne Tl = TL
l  TX
l , Fl = FL
l  FX
l ,a n dx(Fl)=x(FL
l )  x(FX
l ) where l = K>P>O.W e
have FK =0 . In addition, FP A 0 and FO A 0 by Proposition 1. Then from (9), we have
TK = PFP + OFO  [(1  K)K  OP]x(FP)  OPx(FO) (10)
By the concavity of x(·),w eh a v ex(Fl)  x0(FL
l )Fl.W et h u sh a v e
TK  PFP + OFO  [(1  K)K  OP]x0(FL
P)FP  OPx0(FL
O)FO















FO ? 0=FK (11)
Thus WL
K ?WX
K.G i v e nt h a tFL
K = FX
K, it follows that yL
K Ay X
K.
Next, we consider the case that neither DIC binds under independent taxation. The equation (9)
still holds under uniﬁed taxation. By the nonbinding DIC’s, under independent taxation, the LHS
17is strictly less than RHS in (9). As a result, the LHS is strictly less than RHS in (10). The rest of
the proof is the same as in the previous case, except that in (11) the ﬁrst inequality is replaced by a
strict inequality, and the second inequality is replaced by an equality.
For the case that DIC-H is slack but DIC-M binds, the proof is exactly the same as in the case





O. That is, type O receives less subsidies and is worse o
under independent taxation.
Proof. Again, we ﬁrst consider the case that both DIC’s bind under independent taxation. Suppose
WL
O  WX

































O. The second equality follows from






. The last inequality holds since x0(FW) 
x0(FL
O) A 1@O.T h u sw eh a v eyL
O Ay X
O.N e x tw ec o m p a r eyL
P and yX

































where the last inequality follows from the fact that x0(FW)  x0(FL
O) A 1@O A 1@P.T h u syL
P Ay X
P.




K,w eh a v eyL
K Ay X








satisfy all the constraints under uniﬁed taxation,
thus it is a feasible solution as well. However, the fact that yL
m Ay X
m for all m = K>P>O contradicts







are the optimal solution for uniﬁed taxation.
18Therefore, we must have 0 AWL
O AWX



































O  0= (13)
Thus yL
m  yX
m for all m = K>P>O and yL
m Ay X















. Therefore, we must have yL
O ?y X
O.
Next, we consider the case that neither DIC binds under independent taxation. The proof is
very similar to that for the case with binding DIC’s. We ﬁrst show WL
O AW X
O . Suppose in negation
WL
O  WX





P (now the second equality in (12) should be replaced by a strict inequality, due to the strict
inequality of DIC-M). Again the same contradiction can be reached. To show yL
O ?y X
O,w ef o l l o w
similar steps as before. The only change in the proof is that the second equality in (13) should be
replaced by a strict inequality.
Finally, consider the case that DIC-H is slack but DIC-M binds under independent taxation.
Given that DIC-M binds, the proof is exactly the same as in the case when both DIC’s are binding.







are also feasible under
uniﬁed taxation, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 1 Equilibrium welfare is always greater under uniﬁed taxation than under independent
taxation.
Even if the uniﬁed taxation system is welfare superior, it is clear that if the taxation system is
chosen by majority rule at the constitutional stage, and if l ? 1@2 for l = K>O, then the independent
taxation regime can be chosen if and only if it yields higher equilibrium utility for the middle class
(given that the rich always prefer the independent taxation system and the poor always prefer the
uniﬁed taxation system). It is impossible to obtain general analytical results on the preferences of
19the middle type as a function of relative productivities (distribution of ’s) and income distribution
(distribution of ’s). However, the computations we now turn to, provide interesting results.17
2.4 Constitutional Choice
We now augment our above model with a constitutional stage (in period w =0 ), where the taxation
regime is decided by simple majority rule. That is, a taxation system (uniﬁed or independent) is
chosen as long as more than 50% of citizens are in favor of that taxation system. We assume that
l ? 1@2 for l = K>O. So the constitutional choice will be determined by the preference of the
middle class.
Fix K =2and O =1for all the numerical computations in this section. Our computations
ﬁrst show, for any percentage of each type, that
Result 1 There exists a cuto W
P 5 (O>K) such that type P prefers the independent taxation
system if and only if her type is higher than W
P.
Our computations also show that given P 5 (1>2) and K = O =( 1 P)@2: 18
Result 2 There exists a cuto W
P such that type P prefers the independent taxation regime if and
only if P A W
P.
Intuitively, as P or P increases, type P’s interest aligns more with that of type K.
These results have an important implication in terms of welfare. Assume K =2 >O =1and
P =1 =51. We can compute W
P by keeping K = O. We can then compare the welfare of a
Federation with W
P   with that of a competitive taxation regime obtained with W
P + .E v e n
though the average  is higher in the second case, welfare is higher in the former Federation, for 
su!ciently small (by Corollary 1 above). This means that
Corollary 2 A country with “better” initial conditions (higher productivity, or higher average 
here) may end up with lower welfare because of a suboptimal constitutional choice due to majority
decision making at the constitutional stage.
Another interesting observation comes from the following exercise: ﬁx P and P (or O); then
our computations show that
17Detailed computations and Matlab code used in this project are available upon request.
18When P increases, we let K and O go down by the same compensating amount.
20Result 3 There exists W
O such that type P prefers independent taxation if and only if O A W
O.
This is very intuitive: as the percentage of the poor goes up, the fear for having to support the
poor increases and the middle type becomes more likely to prefer the independent tax regime.
Our computations also reveal some less intuitive relationships between initial conditions and
constitutional preferences by the middle type:
Result 4 Both W
P and W
P are decreasing in n.
This suggests that when n decreases, for a given P or P,t h em i d d l et y p ei sm o r el i k e l yt o
prefer the uniﬁed taxation system. The schedules W
P(n) and W
P(n) are shown in Figure 1 below,
where W
P(n) is plotted under the parameter values K = P = O =1 @3,a n dW
P(n) is plotted by
keeping K = O,a n dP =1 =3.19
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Figure 1: Schedules of W
P(n) and W
P(n)
An intuition for Result 4 is as follows: under both taxation regimes the middle class “beneﬁts”
from the existence of richer citizens who pay more taxes and “suers” from the existence of poorer
citizens who need to receive subsidies; under uniﬁed taxation these two eects do not depend on n,
while under independent taxation when n goes down the “beneﬁts” mentioned above go down, since
the rich secures higher rents as the competition between two States becomes more intense. Given
that there is no such competition eect for the poor, the relative attractiveness of the two regimes
19Our computations show that the higher the selected value for P, the lower the schedule of 
W
P(n).T h i s i s
consistent with our Results 1 and 2.
21to the middle class must therefore change in the direction of a more likely preference for the uniﬁed
system. The intuition for the monotonicity of W
P(n) is similar: when n goes down, the previously
indierent type between the two systems should prefer the uniﬁed regime, and indierence can be
restored if the middle class is larger, to compensate in terms of per capita share of the transfers to
the poor.
In a picture with P on horizontal axis and W
P on vertical axis, our computations show that:
Result 5 W
P decreases as P increases (while the other two types decrease symmetrically at the
same time).
Figure 2 below is plotted with n =1 .I n c r e a s i n gP in this way reduces inequality but also reduces
total productivity when P ? 1=5.I fP is less than the mean, the reduced total productivity makes
the fear of being “milked” by the poor increase even if there are less poor agents, because that
reduction is perfectly oset by an equal reduction in the number of rich.20















Figure 2: Schedule of W
P(P)
It is di!cult to design a comparative statics exercise in the three type model to isolate the
eect of inequality, since, as shown above, any change in the productivity distribution has also other
confounding eects. We will be able to say something clearer about the role of initial inequality
when studying the case of a continuum of ability types.
20The pattern between 
W
P and P is a fortiori decreasing when the increase in P is balanced by a reduction in K
only, without touching the percentage of the poor. Type P is more worried about being milked by the poor, which
leads to a lower cuto of 
W
P.
22In summary, weaker horizontal preferences (lower n) would push towards uniﬁcation of ﬁscal
policy in the region, but the middle class is likely to go for that only if the poor are not too poor
and not too many, or if there is a su!ciently large fraction of high income earners.
This set of results ﬁts our intuition about the situation within the European Union, where
mobility sharply increased in the 90’s and things seemed at some point mature for a new European
Constitution that would concentrate a larger fraction of policy decisions in Brussels, but such a
preference for uniﬁcation of policy making has reversed itself after the enlargement of the Union to
include a set of poorer countries that have altered the distribution of income in the Union in the
opposite direction.21
3 The Continuous-type Model
In this section we extend our analysis to the continuous type case, which can be regarded as the
limiting case of many ﬁnite types. Speciﬁcally, in the vertical dimension worker-consumers are
distributed on [>] with density function i(),w h e r ei() is continuous, strictly positive everywhere
in its support. All the other assumptions are the same as those in the previous discrete type model.
As in the discrete type model, citizens can only be sorted in the vertical dimension. Thus,
oering a tax schedule W(T) is equivalent to oering a menu of consumption and production pairs
{F()>T()}M[>]. Deﬁne the tax function W()=T()  F(). In the autarkic economy (no tax),
a citizen’s optimal consumption is determined by (4).
Again we will consider uniﬁed and independent taxation rules. Under either the uniﬁed or
independent taxation rule, incentive compatibility has to hold for each type of citizen conditional on
her State of residence. Deﬁne
Y (>b )= x(F(b )) 
T(b )

to be the utility for a citizen with (vertical) type  who accepts contract {F(b )>T(b )}. Incentive
21The decisions about taxation reforms may well depend on the voting system in the Union: in fact, if two rich
countries accept a third poorer country in the Union, perhaps for reasons of economies of scale in a larger market, the
“popular vote” would be more likely than earlier to be in favor of uniﬁed tax system; but a majority in each State, if
required, would be more di!cult than before to materialize, since the median voters of the two richer countries would
be against supporting also the more poor people of the new country added to the Union. All these issues are for future
research and applications of the ideas in this paper.
23compatibility requires that
Y (>)  Y (>b ) ;(>b ) 5 [>]2=
Let y() denote the equilibrium rent provision to type- citizen: y()=Y (>). By the standard






[x(F())  y()] (14)
T0()  0 (15)
Constraint (15) is the monotonicity requirement as in the three-type model.
By (14), given y(), T() is uniquely determined and so is F(). For convenience, we will work
with the rent provision contract y().22 It can be easily veriﬁed that T0 = x0(F)F0.T h u s ,a si nt h e
three-type model, T0()  0 i fa n do n l yi fF0()  0.
Given y() provided by the State in question and the other State’s rent provision y3l(),t h e









Under uniﬁed taxation, the objective of the Federal authority is to maximize the weighted average
utility of all the citizens in both States, where the weight function z()=i() (in the same spirit as
in the three-type model). We focus on the symmetric solution in which the same menu of contracts
is applied to both States and the resulting “market shares” are symmetric (no citizen moves). We
can thus drop the State index to write {Fl()>T l()} = {F()>T()}, l =1 >2. Mathematically, this
22This approach follows the lead of Armstrong and Vickers (2001), who model ﬁrms as supplying utility directly to
consumers.
23Our main results should not be altered as long as we work with concave utility functions.
















[T()  F()]i()g =0
The last constraint is the resource or budget constraint (RC).
To solve this optimal control problem, as is standard in the literature, we ﬁrst ignore the
monotonicity constraint on T() to consider the relaxed program (and this approach will be jus-
tiﬁed if the solution of T() is indeed monotone). To deal with the resource constraint, we deﬁne




[T()  F()]i()g> hence
M0()=[ T()  F()]i()=
N o w( R C )i se q u i v a l e n tt oM()=0and M()=0 . The Hamiltonian of the problem is:










F  y)  F]
Deﬁne } =
s
F, then the Hamiltonian can be rewritten as
K = yi + 
1

[2}  y]+[(2}  y)  }2]


































}0  2+( } + }0  2)
i0
i







where the boundary conditions above are directly implied from the transversality conditions ()=
()=0and (17). The above second-order (linear) dierential equation system has a closed-form


























Under the independent taxation regime, each State l chooses its taxation schedule simultaneously
and independently. Given y3l(), the rent provision provided by the other State, State l will choose a
rent provision y() to maximize the weighted average utility of the citizens residing in its own State.
Again we focus on symmetric equilibria, in which the two States choose the same taxation sched-
ule. Suppose State 2’s rent provision contract is given by yW(). Then if State 1 oers rent provision
contract y(),b y( 1 6 )t h et y p e -  “market share” for State 1 is given by ()=1+1
n[y()  yW()].






















F  y)  F]()i()g is the state variable associated with the budget con-
straint. Note that the market share () does not directly enter the State’s objective function. How-
ever, the States compete for high-type citizens as the market shares aect the resource constraints
and hence the ability to redistribute.
26We again drop the monotonicity constraint T0()  0 and deﬁne the Hamiltonian (with } =
s
F):
K = yi +


(2}  y)+[(2}  y)  }2]i=






















=0,  is a constant














M0 = (2}  y)  }2
Letting z =2 }  y, the above system becomes

































(M00 +2 }}0)  (M0 + }2)
¤
(27)
Substituting (26) and (27) into (23), we have
M00 =2 (   })}0 (28)
From (25), we have
27M00 =2 n  n(}00 + }0)  n(} + }0  2)
i0
i











}0  2+( } + }0  2)
i0
i












where the boundary conditions above, as in the uniﬁed taxation case, follow from the transversality
conditions ()=()=0 . Note that this is again a second-order dierential equation system with
two boundary values. It is nonlinear, however, in this case. The complication is that a closed-form
solution is no longer available. The analysis can easily become intractable if we work with general
distributions. For this reason in the next subsection we will focus on the uniform distribution case,





3.3 The Uniform Distribution Case













into (22), we obtain the solution in the uniform distribution case:








,o re q u i v a l e n t l y ,
@  W r 3=55 (33)
Note that }0() A 0 implies that T0() A 0. Given our focus on perfect sorting equilibria and
to justify our approach to solve the relaxed program by ignoring the monotonicity constraint, we
maintain the sorting condition (33) throughout this section.24 Intuitively, the higher the @,t h e
24This is a similar condition to the one that Rochet and Stole (2002) impose to guarantee separating equilibrium in
a nonlinear pricing setting with random participation. When this assumption fails, pooling occurs at the lower end.
28more costly is sorting along the vertical dimension. When @ is large enough, pooling at the lower
end is optimal.




and } =  for  = , .T h er e s u l to fe !ciency
at the top is standard in the screening literature. E!ciency at the bottom, which is implied from
the transversality condition, however, is dierent from what we have seen from our base model with
three types.25




under uniﬁed regime. That is, the tax is
increasing in the type. Given (RC), this also implies that the low types receive subsidies and the
high types pay taxes.












Despite the lack of closed-form solutions, we are able to explore some analytical properties of
the equilibrium based on this ODE system. Our ﬁrst result is that under independent taxation,
consumption is downward distorted for all but the top and bottom:
Lemma 5   }L A 0 for  5 (,).





[1 + |0 
2
n(1  |0)]. It is equivalent to show that | never drops strictly below the zero line (| =0 ).
First, we show that the curve is initially shooting above, i.e., |0() A 0. Suppose not, then there
are two cases:
Case 1: |0() ? 0.S i n c e|()=0 ,i nt h i sc a s ew eh a v e|(+) ? 0.T h a ti s ,t h e| curve is initially
shooting below. Given the endpoint condition |()=0 , at some point the curve has to shoot back







|(ˆ )] ? 0=
This implies that |(ˆ 
+
) ?| (ˆ ) ? 0, i.e., the curve keeps shooting below right after ˆ .H o w e v e r ,
given the endpoint condition, the curve has to come back at some later point. But our preceding
25A reconciliation is provided in the nonlinear pricing literature by Rochet and Stole (2002), who demonstrate that
in a ﬁnite type model, the quality distortion for the lowest type disappears as the number of types goes to inﬁnity.
29argument suggests that the curve can never come back to the zero line, contradicting the endpoint
condition.







Thus |(+) ? 0. Now connecting our argument from here with the argument in the ﬁrst case above,
we establish contradiction again.
Thus we show that the curve is initially shooting above (|0() A 0). Given the endpoint condition,
the curve will eventually drop back to the zero line. If it drops back to zero exactly at  = ¯ ,w e
are done; otherwise, there is ˆ  5 (,), such that |0(ˆ )=0and |(ˆ ) ? 0. Now following the same
argument above, | can never get back to zero, contradiction. This establishes that |() A 0 except
 = , .
So as in the uniﬁed taxation case, consumption is also distorted downward for all but the top
and the bottom types for any nA0.N o t et h a tt h i si sv e r yd i erent from a result obtained in the
duopoly case in Rochet and Stole (2002), who show that when competition is su!ciently intense (n
su!ciently small), quality distortions disappear completely.
The next lemma establishes that the equilibrium under independent taxation exhibits perfect
sorting.
Lemma 6 Suppose condition (33) holds, then }0
L() A 0 and hence W0
L() A 0 for any  5 [>].
Proof. See Appendix.
The proof of Lemma 6 suggests that whenever the optimal solution under uniﬁed taxation ex-
hibits perfect sorting, the equilibrium under independent taxation must exhibits perfect sorting. On
the other hand, it is possible that pooling occurs under uniﬁed regime but the equilibrium under
independent taxation exhibits perfect sorting.26 The implication is that sorting occurs more easily
under a competition regime. The intuition is similar to that provided in Yang and Ye (2008): higher
types receive higher rents under competition, which relaxes the IC constraint, making it easier to
sort the agents.
The next proposition displays interesting comparative statics with respect to the role of mobility:
26Consider the following example.  is uniformly distributed on [1>4], n =0 =5. Under uniﬁed taxation, the monotonic-
ity constraint is violated and pooling occurs in the neighborhood of the low end. However, the equilibrium under
independent taxation exhibits perfect sorting.
30Proposition 4 Let n2 ?n 1. Under independent taxation, (i) A} 2 A} 1 for all  5 (>); (ii)
W1() AW 2() and W2() ?W 1(); (iii) the tax schedule for (relatively) rich people is ﬂatter under n2.
Proof. See Appendix.
By continuity, we also have W1() AW 2() for types su!ciently close to ,a n dW2() ?W 1()
for types su!ciently close to .A s n goes down, the competition between two States becomes
more intense. Proposition 4 suggests that as mobility (or competition) increases, the consumption
distortion is reduced, the rich (types su!ciently close to the top) pay less taxes, and the poor
(types su!ciently close to the bottom) receive less subsidies. While these results are obtained
computationally in our three type model, they are obtained analytically in this continuous type
model. Thus the result that increased mobility leads to lower progressivity is a fairly robust prediction.
As in the three type model, as n $ 0, W()=0 . The solution under uniﬁed taxation, on the other
hand, is independent of n, which can be regarded as the limiting case when n $ +4 (this can be
seen from comparing (21) and (30)).
In Simula and Trannoy (2009), a “curse” of middle-skilled workers is identiﬁed, in the sense that
the marginal tax rate is negative at the top and the average tax rate is decreasing over some interval
close to the top. Such a curse does not occur in our model.27 The dierence arises for the following
reasons. In Simula and Trannoy, higher types have lower moving cost than lower cost types. This
means that competition for top types is stronger than the competition for middle types, thus a
negative marginal tax rate might occur at the top. In our model, all (vertical) types have the same
moving cost given the same horizontal type. We have thus demonstrated that the “curse” of middle
types may not arise in a model with outside options endogenously determined.
We next turn to comparing the two taxation systems. This will be done by comparing the ODE
systems (31) and (34). Using subscripts X and L to denote the uniﬁed and independent taxation
regimes, respectively, we can state the following comparison results:




X() for  5 [>b ) and
}0
L() ?} 0
X() for  5 (b >];( i i )}L() A} X() for any  5 (>); (iii) W0
L() ?W0
X() for  5 (b >).
Proof. Part (i) is established in the proof of Lemma 6.
Part (ii) follows from (i) given the boundary conditions }L()  }X()=}L()  }X()=0 = For
 5 (b >],t h a t}X ?} L and }0
X A} 0
L implies that W0
L() ?W 0
X(),a sW0 =2 (   })}0 under both
27Under independent taxation, W
0 =2 (  3 })}
0 is always positive as ( 3 }) D 0 and }
0 A 0.
31taxation regimes.
Therefore, under competition all types  5 (>) receive strictly higher consumption. Moreover,
the tax schedule is ﬂatter for the rich (those with su!ciently high types).
Proposition 6 (i) There is a e  5 (>) such that yL(e )=yX(e ), yL() ?y X() for  5 [>e ) and
yL() Ay X() for  5 (e >]; (ii) WL() AW X() and WL() AW X().






[2(}L  }X)  (yL  yX)]= (35)
Over (>),g i v e n}L A} X, from (35) we have y0
L Ay 0
X whenever yL = yX.T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t o v e r
(>), yL and yX cross at most once, and at the intersection yL must cross yX from below.
Next we rule out the case that yL and yX never cross in the interior domain. Suppose yL() 
yX().T h e nyL()  yX() for all  and yL() Ay X() for any A . This contradicts the fact that
yX() is the optimal solution under the uniﬁed regime, while yL() is one of the feasible schedules
under the uniﬁed regime. Therefore, yL() ?y X(). Given that }L()=}X(),i tm u s tb et h ec a s e
that WL() AW X().
Next we rule out the case that yL()  yX(). Suppose this is the case. Then yL() ?y X() for
all ?.A t, yL() ?y X()> which implies that WL() AW X().A t, yL()  yX(), which implies



















T h eﬁ r s tt e r mi nt h eb r a c k e ti sp o s i t i v es i n c eA} L() A} X().I f yL() ?y X(),w em u s th a v e








 WX()g =0 .
Thus, yL crosses yX (from below) exactly once at some interior  5 (>).T h i sp r o v e sp a r t( i ) .
Part (ii) follows from part (i) and the boundary conditions.
So the rich (high-type citizens) are better o while the poor (low-type citizens) are worse o
moving from uniﬁed to competitive taxation. The highest type (and the types su!ciently close to
the highest type) pay less tax and the lowest type (and the types su!ciently close to the lowest type)
get less subsidy under independent taxation.
To illustrate, we consider the example with  =1and  =2 . We can plot the tax schedules under
both taxation regimes for any given value of n.T h ec a s ew i t hn =0 =5 i sg i v e ni nF i g u r e3b e l o w .I t
32is evident that for this case the tax schedule under independent regime is everywhere ﬂatter, which
strengthens our analytical result given in Proposition 6. Generally speaking, higher types are taxed
less and lower types get less subsidy under the independent system.












Figure 3: Tax Schedule Comparison with Uniform Distribution
With these results at hand, we are now ready to examine the determinants of constitutional
choice with a continuum of types.
3.4 Constitutional Choice
With continuous types the constitutional choice is determined by the median voter’s preference. As
in the three-type model, the preference of the median type can only be obtained using numerical
computations. We thus go back to our model with general distributions for vertical types to char-
acterize constitutional choice as a function of the mobility parameter, the distribution of relative
classes (the types), and the distribution of income.
With any given distribution I (density function i), our computations can be done based on (21)
and (30). Since the Pareto distribution is commonly adopted to proxy real world income inequality
in the taxation literature, we consider the following truncated Pareto distribution family:
i()=
331
1  43 and 1  I()=
3  43
1  43 ,  5 [1>4]=28 (36)
28With the support of  being [1>4], the highest type’s pre-tax income is 16 times that of the lowest type.
33Note that the uniform distribution is a special case of the Pareto distribution family (with
 = 1). As  increases, the density becomes more tilted toward lower types (more poor peo-
ple). The tax schedules under two taxation systems are compared in Figure 4 below (plotted for the
case  =1and n =0 =5), which exhibits the same pattern as in the case of uniform distribution.
















Figure 4: Tax Schedule Comparison with Pareto Distribution
Recall that with uniform distribution we established that the utility schedule yL crosses yX once
from below. Our computation shows that this pattern of single crossing holds for truncated Pareto
distributions as well. Let W be the indierence type at which yL crosses yX. Then all the types below
W prefer the uniﬁed regime and all the types above W prefer the independent regime. The following
table shows how the indierence type W shifts as n changes (for the truncated Pareto distribution,
the computations are done based on the case  = 0=15).
Table 1: How W shifts as n changes
n =1 n =0 =5 n =0 =3 n =0 =2 n =0 =1 n =0 =03
Uniform [1>3] 1=8422 1=8529 1=8577 1=8635 1=8711 1=8815
Pareto [1>4],  = 0=15 2=0471 2=0626 2=0728 2=0798 2=0889 2=0965
The above table indicates that W is monotonically decreasing in n.T h i si sc o n s i s t e n tw i t hR e s u l t
4i nt h et h r e et y p em o d e l . Therefore, as the moving cost decreases, the measure of citizens who
prefer the uniﬁed regime increases. As a result, the uniﬁed regime is more likely to be chosen at the
constitutional stage for a smaller moving cost, other things equal. The intuition for this result is
analogous to that provided in the three type model. As n decreases, the previously indierent type
34(the median type) “beneﬁts” less from the presence of the rich (all the types above her), hence will
switch her preferences toward the uniﬁed regime, whose solution does not depend on n.
For the range of mobility parameter n reported in the table, the uniﬁed regime is always chosen
in the uniform distribution case (since the median type p =2 ). However, for the truncated Pareto
distribution case, the median type is p =2 =0732. Hence the independent regime will be chosen for
cases n =0 =3>0=5> and 1, and uniﬁed regime will be chosen for cases n =0 =01>0=1> and 0=2.
We are also interested in how changes in the (type) income distribution aect the constitutional
choice. Fix n =0 =5, and consider the truncated Pareto distributions given in (36). The following
table reports how the indierence type W and the median type p change as  varies:
Table 2: How W and p shift as  changes
 0=5 0=3 0=2 0=15 0=10 =51 1 =5
W 2=136 2=0933 2=0731 2=0626 2=0519 1=9437 1=8431 1=7645
p 2=25 2=1484 2=0981 2=0732 2=0486 1=7778 1=60 1=4675
For all the cases we examined, the solutions exhibit perfect sorting. Two observations are worth
noting. First, as  increases (more poor around), the indierent type monotonically decreases. Again
this is consistent with what we found from the three type model. This is intuitive: having more poor
implies more taxes from the higher types in the uniﬁed regime, while in the independent regime the
solution is closer to autarky. Therefore, the indierence type will decrease, as in Result 3. However,
if  is su!ciently large (A0=15), the median type prefers the uniﬁed regime. Thus having more
poor people in this continuous type case makes the choice of the uniﬁed system more likely, which
seems to be inconsistent with our ﬁnding in the three type model. This happens in this Pareto
distribution case simply because the indierence type decreases slower than the median type:a s
the size of the poor increases, the median type becomes even poorer. This observation highlights a
dierence between our three-type model and the continuous type model, that is, t h em e d i a nt y p ei s
generically dierent from the type who is indierent between the various constitutional choices, and
they vary at dierent rates when the parameters change.
Finally, we study how the degree of inequality aects constitutional choice by examining a distrib-






[10  d(2  )2]> 5 [1>3]
35with d 5 [0>10).T h e c a s e d =0corresponds to the uniform distribution. As d increases, the
distribution becomes more concentrated around the mean or median (which is 2 in this case), so
inequality decreases. The computation results are reported in the following table. (W is once again
the cuto type who is indierent between the two tax regimes):
Table 3: How Wshifts as inequality parameter changes
d =0 d =3 d =5 d =7 d =9
W 1=8813 1=8615 1=8561 1=8672 1=8728
The table shows that the relationship between inequality and the indierence type is not monotonic
in this particular continuous type distribution case.
4C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper has extended the analysis of optimal income taxation to the case in which strategic
authorities compete for heterogeneous citizens, and where the heterogeneity is in productivity as well
as mobility characteristics. Every agent’s productivity and ability to move are private information
and we have explored the relative importance of these two dimensions for the degree of progressivity
of the tax system, comparing the competitive nonlinear taxation game with the uniﬁed optimal
taxation benchmark of Mirrlees (1971). Moreover, the model has allowed us to discuss the incentives
of dierent classes of agents to advocate for dierent systems at the constitutional stage.
The independent taxation system yields lower progressivity than the uniﬁed case. Under compe-
tition the rich are better o and the poor are worse o, and whether the middle type is better o or
worse o depends on mobility and on the distribution of income. In particular, in our base model
with three types, we have shown that the middle type is more likely to choose the uniﬁed system
when the mobility level is high (n is smaller), or when the proportion of the poor is not too large.
Our analysis of the continuous type model conﬁrms most of the main ﬁndings from our three type
model, and provides some additional insights for this competitive nonlinear taxation framework.
An important extension of this model will be the consideration of asymmetric initial conditions.
Tracing the impact of dierent initial conditions on constitutional choice will also allow us to start
a dynamic analysis of persistence of inequality dierences across countries due to the dierent in-
stitutions that have dierent feedbacks on inequality. Our model suggests that countries with less
inequality may choose independent regimes, but independent regimes do not reduce inequality as
36much as a uniﬁed system does. Hence a static model cannot su!ce to analyze the important rela-
tionship between inequality, redistribution, and institutions.
One feature of our current analysis is that the constitutional choice is made by the median voter,
while the States are weighted utilitarian once the constitution has been chosen. If one considered the
(fully normative) alternative in which at the constitutional stage institutions are chosen in a welfare-
maximizing manner, then clearly the centralized taxation regime would always be chosen (regardless
of type distributions or mobility costs). On the other hand, if one considered the opposite (fully
positive) alternative in which the taxation policy is chosen according to the median voter’s wishes
like at the constitutional stage, again the centralized institution would always be chosen in our base
model with three ability types.29 The coexistence of centralized and decentralized taxation regimes
in the real world thus suggests that neither of these alternative assumptions, albeit consistent, can be
completely satisfactory. Even though the assumptions we have made for the two stages may appear
somewhat inconsistent, this current research represents a ﬁrst attempt to bridge constitutional choice
and taxation design in a way that aims to shed light on when we should expect to see one system
or the other. In a sense we have provided a benchmark where citizens compare institutions under
the most benevolent assumptions about their functioning. In future work, more realistic political
economy models of the dierent regimes could replace our optimal taxation framework, and their
equilibrium outcomes (and consequent constitutional choice incentives) will be usefully contrasted
with the benchmark we established here.
Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 :This can be shown in the following 4 steps:
1. The monotonicity of T> and hence F.
Adding GLFKP to XLFPK,w eh a v e(TK TP)( 1
P  1
K)  0. This implies that TK  TP.
By similar arguments, we can show that TK  TP  TO.B y GLFKP, TK  TP implies
that FK  FP. By similar arguments, TK  TP  TO implies that FK  FP  FO.
2. GLFKO and XLFOK are inactive.
29In the continuum type model, since the median voter only has measure zero, the welfare for herself can be trivially
made inﬁnity. Thus letting median voter decide on taxation policies will render the maximization problem completely
uninteresting.
37Adding GLFKP to GLFPO,w eh a v e










The last inequality follows from TP  TO. The above inequality implies GLFKO.B yas i m i l a r
argument, one can show that XLFOK is inactive. Now we have 4 IC constraints left, plus the
monotonicity of T and F.
3. Under uniﬁed taxation, GLFKP and GLFPO bind, and all the other constraints are inactive.
We ﬁrst show that GLFKP must bind. Suppose not. Then we can increase TK by %,a n d
decrease TP and TO by the same amount
K
13K%,w h e r e% is strictly positive and su!ciently
small. Note that this change does not aect the resource constraint. With su!ciently small
%, GLFKP still holds. The other three constraints hold as well. But this change leads to the

















Therefore, GLFKP must bind. By similar arguments, if GLFPO does not bind, then we can
construct the following change: increase TK and TP by the same amount %, and decrease TO
by
13O
O %. The RC and 4 IC constraints are still satisﬁed, but it leads to an increase in the
objective function. Therefore, GLFPO must bind.
4. Under uniﬁed taxation, the two XLF’s are inactive.








w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e sXLFPK. By a similar argument, one can show that XLFOP is inactive.
Therefore, under uniﬁed taxation IC holds if and only if the monotonicity constraint holds and
the two DIC’s (6) bind.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 :We illustrate this point by considering the following case. Suppose in equi-
librium UIC binds for both P and O types (the proofs for the cases that only one UIC binds are
similar). In this case, one can show that FO is not distorted, but both FP and FK are distorted
38upwards (FO ?F P  FK). The binding UIC’s imply that






















The terms in the brackets are negative since FK  FP AF O = FW
O. Given that WK  WP ?W O,b y
t h er e s o u r c ec o n s t r a i n tw eh a v eWK ? 0 and WO A 0. Now we construct a proﬁtable deviation for one
State. Suppose State 1 decreases WP by %, decreases WO by % and increases WK by
P
K % (%A0 but
small). Note that under the new tax schedule, UIC-L still binds but UIC-M is slack. The change of













































































The inequalities are based on WK ? 0 and WO A 0. Therefore, the new tax schedule is feasible for





























Therefore, it constitutes a proﬁtable deviation for State 1.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :We start with the case that both DIC’s bind under independent taxation.

























































































































 (WK  WO)
K
K
+( WP  WO)
P
P
Given that WK AW P  WO,w eh a v ex0(FX
O)  x0(FL




























































































































































































































































40Finally, consider the case that DIC-H is slack but DIC-M binds under independent taxation.
Given that FL
P = FW
P, we clearly have x0(FX
P) Ax 0(FL
P). The proof for x0(FX
O) Ax 0(FL
O) is exactly
t h es a m ea st h a ti nt h eﬁ r s tc a s ea b o v e ,a st h ee x p r e s s i o n sf o rP, U and x0(FL
O) are exactly the
same under both cases.
P r o o fo fL e m m a6 :First, whenever }
0
L =0 , }
00
L = 2
 A 0. By the single-crossing lemma, }
0
L has the
single crossing property. That is, }
0
L crosses zero line from below at most once.30
What remains to be shown is that }0
L() A 0.N o w c o m p a r e t w o d i erential equation systems
(31) and (34). Whenever }0
L = }0
X (A 0), we have }00
L ?} 00
X (since   }L A 0 by Lemma 5). By
the single-crossing lemma, the curve }0
L()  }0
X() crosses zero line from above at most once. Given
the boundary conditions }L()  }X()=}L()  }X()=0 , we conclude that }0
L()  }0
X() has to
cross zero line exactly once. That is, there is a b  5 (>) such that }0
X() ?} 0
L() for  5 [>b ),a n d
}0
X() A} 0
L() for  5 (b >]. Given that }0
X() A 0,w eh a v e}0
L() A} 0




L A 0 and (  }L) A 0,w eh a v eW0
L()=2 (   }L)}0
L A 0 for  5 (>).






















Let | = }2  }1= We have |()=|()=0 . We need to show that |() A 0 for all  5 (>).T h e
proof idea resembles that of Lemma 5.
First we show that |0() A 0. Suppose in negation, |0()  0.
Case 1: |0() ? 0. Given that |()=0 , there exists b  5 (>) such that |0(b )=0and |() ? 0
for all  5 (>b ]. But then it is easily veriﬁed that |00(b ) ? 0. This implies that | will always remain
strictly below zero after initially shooting below, a contradiction.
Case 2: |0()=0 . It is easily veriﬁed that in this case all higher derivatives at  are zero:
|(q)()=0for all q  2. This, combined with |()=0 , implies that there exists b  su!ciently
close to , such that |(b )=|0(b )=|00(b )=0 . However, with notation }(b )=}1(b )=}2(b ) and
}0(b )=}0
1(b )=}0














30Therefore, if there is pooling, it must happen at the low end.
41Since }0(b ) A 0 and b   }(b ) A 0, the above expression implies that |00(b ) ? 0, a contradiction.
So the | curve is initially shooting up. Given the endpoint condition, it will eventually come
back to the zero line. If it comes back exactly at , we are done with the proof; otherwise it drops
below zero before reaching the end point . But then there is b  5 (>) such that |0(b )=0and
|() ? 0 for all  5 (>b ]. Applying the same argument to rule out Case 1 above, we can establish
the contradiction. So | has to stay above zero except two boundary points.
(ii) Similarly to the previous proof, that A} 2 A} 1 implies that y2 cross y1 at most once from
below. Again, the case that y1 Ay 2 for all  can be ruled out. But so far the case y1 ?y 2 for all 
cannot be ruled out. Therefore, we can only show W2() ?W 1().
( i i i )N o t et h a tw eh a v e}1() ?} 2() for any interior . This implies that at the neighborhood of
, }0
1 A} 0
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